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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s 2017 ruling in Impression Products v. Lexmark clearly
came as an unwelcome, though not unexpected, shock to patent owners.1
In it, the Supreme Court ruled on two issues—the ability of a patentee to
enforce post-sale restrictions on a patented product and the exhaustion of
the patentee’s rights when the patented product was purchased
internationally. On both counts, the Court took a position unfavorable to
patent owners.2
Part I of this paper introduces patent exhaustion and briefly surveys
the jurisprudence in the area of IP exhaustion. It will become apparent
that in Lexmark, the Supreme Court ruled in line with Univis Lens and
Quanta decisions.3 In the process, the Court also (finally) overruled
Mallinckrodt.4 Interestingly, however, the Court maintained the distinction
from General Talking Pictures and preserved the patentee’s rights when a
licensee makes an unauthorized downstream sale.5
Part II of this paper provides the analysis of the Lexmark Supreme
Court ruling. In Lexmark, on the first issue of post-sale restrictions, the
Court anchored its analysis and holding in the common law doctrine of
rejecting unreasonable “restraints on alienation.”6 The Court ruled that the
*Author is a J.D. 2019 graduate of the University of San Diego School of Law.
Author sincerely thanks Professor Ted Sichelman for his valuable guidance and
continuous encouragement.
1 Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
2 Gene Quinn, Industry Reaction to Impression Products v. Lexmark, IP WATCHDOG
(May 30, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/30/patent-exhaustionsupreme-court-industry-reaction-impression-products-v-lexmark/id=83822/.
3 Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008); United States
v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 254 (1942).
4 Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992), abrogated
by Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).
5 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
6 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1536.
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patentee may not enforce any post-sale restrictions on the patented
product because that would result in undesired “restraint on alienation.”
Instead, the sale (effectively the “first-sale”) would seem to have resulted
in patent exhaustion under the “first-sale doctrine.” Interestingly, the
Court proceeded instead to suggest that the patentees may pursue postsale restriction claims under contract law.
A similar reasoning was put forth in the ruling on patent exhaustion
upon an international sale. An authorized sale of the product—regardless
of the geography—was deemed to have triggered patent exhaustion under
the “first-sale doctrine.”
Despite the seemingly unequivocal message of the holding, the Court
nevertheless left some wiggle room for the patentees to preserve their
rights. Part III of this paper will focus on the issue of exploring a
patentee’s options—in light of the Lexmark ruling—toward ensuring and
preserving its rights to pursue infringement action on downstream players.
Part III will also outline a proposal to structure the transaction of the
patented product as a “lease” instead of a “sale” in order to avoid
exhaustion. Avoiding patent exhaustion by redesigning the transaction will
in turn address both areas of the Lexmark ruling—the enforcement of
post-sale restrictions under patent law and the international exhaustion.
Because of the recency of the Lexmark decision and the lack of prior work
in the area, there has been very little guidance to patentees,
notwithstanding some brief suggestions in literature, toward structuring
transactions to avoid patent exhaustion. This proposal, therefore, attempts
a novel approach to providing meaningful and actionable guidance to the
patentee community.
A lease, being a possessory right, will not result in the transfer of the
title. Because the title is not transferred, “first-sale” is not triggered, thus
preventing patent exhaustion and preserving the patentee’s rights to
pursue infringement claims. But, structuring the transaction as a lease must
follow specific constraints to satisfy a two-step analysis courts have
followed in evaluating such transactions. The first step involves analysis of
the transaction under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) to
distinguish a lease from a security interest, followed by the second step of
assessing preservation of a meaningful reversionary interest to avoid the
risk of the lease transaction being recharacterized as a sale. The UCC and
the vast body of case law from bankruptcy courts provide substantial
guidance in this area.
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Additional refinements are suggested when the patentee licenses the
technology to a manufacturer licensee instead of selling the patented
product directly to the end-consumer. In such a scenario, the licensing
transaction between the patentee and the licensee manufacturer will need
to restrict the licensee to “lease” the product to downstream players. The
“lease” agreement between a licensee and downstream players may be
implemented via a shrink-wrap/click-wrap agreement.
This approach essentially involves a business model innovation on the
patentee’s part. Such a fundamental change may be difficult to implement
and will require close alignment between all parties involved, including
licensee manufacturers and end-consumers. There will be additional
execution complexities due to the resource and logistical requirements of
the solution. Nevertheless, given the significant benefits patentees will
realize by avoiding patent exhaustion, especially in light of the Lexmark
ruling, patentees should be highly motivated to explore this option.
I. PATENT EXHAUSTION AND PATENT EXHAUSTION JURISPRUDENCE
A. Patent Exhaustion
A United States patent entitles the patent holder, for a period of 20
years, to “exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling
[its] invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States.”7 Whoever engages in one of these acts “without
authority” from the patentee may face liability for patent infringement.8
However, when a patentee sells one of its products, the patentee can no
longer control that item through the patent laws—its patent rights are said
to “exhaust.”9 The purchaser and all subsequent owners are free to use or
resell the product, just like any other item of personal property, without
fear of an infringement lawsuit.10

35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
9 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1533.
10 Id.
7
8

140

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 22

B. Patent Exhaustion Jurisprudence
Patent exhaustion jurisprudence dates back to 1873 with the case of
Adams v. Burke.11 In Adams, the patentee authorized a licensee to make, use
and sell patented coffin lids only within a ten-mile radius of Boston.12 A
customer of the licensee purchased the patented coffin lids within the tenmile radius but later resold them outside of the ten-mile radius.13 When
the patentee sued the customer, the Supreme Court was faced for the first
time with the question of whether the first sale of the patent product had
exhausted the patent rights.14 The Supreme Court in Adams held that once
a patented article was lawfully made and sold, there was no restriction on
its use that can be asserted by the patentee, his assignees, or his licensees.15
The Court further confirmed this understanding when it ruled in Keeler
v. Standard Folding Bed Co. that the patentee had exhausted its claims on the
patented products post first-sale, and thus could not bring an infringement
action for its products re-sold in the reserved territory.16
In the 1938 case of General Talking Pictures v. Western Elec. Co., the
Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Brandeis, first upheld
the “fields of use” limitation in patent licenses.17 In General Talking Pictures,
AT&T owned patents on vacuum tubes (amplifiers) and licensed the
patents to American Transformer Company to manufacture tubes for use
in non-commercial amplifiers.18 AT&T provided licenses to other companies
(its subsidiaries) in the field of commercial use, or large amplifiers for use in
theaters.19 The vacuum tubes used in the different fields were

11 Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 (1873) (ruling that exhaustion occurred when
the coffin with the patented lid was sold, invalidating post-use restriction).
12 Id. at 456.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 457.
16 Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 661 (1895); see also 8 U.S.C.S.A.
§ 9444 (1916) (summarizing the holding in Keeler as “[a] dealer in territory reserved by the
patentee may purchase the patented articles from a licensee of other territory, through an
agent in such territory, and import and resell them in the reserved territory, without
infringing any rights of the patentee”).
17 See Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 127 (field-of-use limitations in patent licenses
were enforceable in a patent infringement suit in federal court against the licensee and
those acting in concert with it).
18 W. Elec. Co. v. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
19 Gen. Talking Pictures, 305 U.S. at 125–26.
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indistinguishable.20 American Transformer Company sold its products to
General Talking Pictures, which knew of the field-of-use limitation and
ignored it.21 The majority upheld the field-of-use restriction:
As the restriction was legal and the amplifiers were made and
sold outside the scope of the license the effect is precisely the
same as if no license whatsoever had been granted to
Transformer Company. And as Pictures Corporation knew the
facts, it is in no better position than if it had manufactured the
amplifiers itself without a license. It is liable because it has used
the invention without license to do so.22

General Talking Pictures continues to be good law, albeit as stated in
Lexmark, for “the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given
authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the
patentee’s rights.”23
In the 1942 case of U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., the Supreme Court extended
the scope of the patent exhaustion doctrine to components of an
unfinished patented product.24 This landmark decision found that an
authorized and unrestricted sale of a patented article, even when the article
was only a component of the patented combination, exhausted the patent
rights.25 The Univis opinion stated that whether the licensee sells the
patented article in its completed form or before completion, the patented
article is effectively “beyond the reach of the monopoly which that patent
confers” after the first authorized sale.26 Univis continues to be good law
and is universally cited in patent exhaustion cases.
In relatively modern era jurisprudence, the Federal Circuit in
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. upheld the post-sale restriction that
prohibited the buyer from reusing the device, holding that such a
restriction was enforceable under patent law if the manufacturer's
restriction was reasonably within the patent grant.27 Mallinckrodt labeled
the devices it sold to hospitals with the notice “For Single Patient Use

20 W.

Elec. Co., 16 F. Supp. at 296.
Id. at 126.
22 Id. at 127.
23 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1535.
24 Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. at 250–51.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 252.
27 Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 708.
21
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Only.”28 Apparently, due to the high price of the device, the hospitals did
not follow the “Single Use” restriction and sent the devices to Medipart
for reconditioning.29 Medipart cleaned, reconditioned, and returned the
devices to the hospital for reuse at a fraction of the cost of a new device.30
This was considered infringement.31 The Federal Circuit held that patent
owners could sell patented goods with a restrictive notice and thereby
restrict the disposition of the goods by the purchasers, unless there existed
price-fixing and tie-in restrictions.32 This ruling was a departure from
earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence on exhaustion.33 Eventually, the
Supreme Court overruled Mallinckrodt in Lexmark.34
Another landmark opinion, Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc.,
established the parameters of patent exhaustion in the context of licensed
products.35 In Quanta, LG Electronics, Inc. (“LGE”) licensed the patents
to Intel Corporation (“Intel”) in a licensing agreement that authorized
Intel to manufacture and sell microprocessors and chipsets using the LGE
patents and also stated that the agreement did not alter patent exhaustion
rules.36 A separate agreement required Intel to give its customers written
notice that the license did not extend to a product made by combining an
Intel product with a non-Intel product, and it provided that a breach of
the agreement would not affect the license agreement.37 Quanta
Computer, Inc. (“Quanta”) purchased microprocessors and chipsets from
Intel and manufactured computers using Intel parts in combination with
non-Intel parts, but did not modify the Intel components.38 LGE asserted
that this combination infringed the LGE patents.39 The Court, in its
opinion, focused on the license agreement and found that nothing in the
license restricted Intel’s right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets to
purchasers that intended to combine them with non-Intel parts.40 Intel's
Id. at 702.
Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 709–10.
32 Id. at 709.
33 Id. at 706.
34 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1534–35.
35 Quanta, 553 U.S. at 638
36 Id. at 623.
37 Id. at 623–24.
38 Id. at 624.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 638.
28
29
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authorized sale to Quanta thus triggered exhaustion, and as a result, LGE
could not assert its patent rights against Quanta.41
The Lexmark ruling, regarding post-sale restrictions, appears to have
generally followed the exhaustion jurisprudence established by Keeler,
Univis Lens, and Quanta. The principal doctrinal underpinning in all three is
the common law rejection of “restraint on alienation.” Mallinckrodt, which
upheld post-sale restrictions, has now been effectively overruled as well.
Even though the Quanta ruling went counter to Mallinckrodt, Mallinckrodt
was not directly addressed in that opinion. However, in the Lexmark
opinion, the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Mallinckrodt was directly
countered and overruled.42 General Talking Pictures however, with the
principle that an unauthorized sale by a licensee will not lead to exhaustion,
remains good law.
II. LEXMARK V. IMPRESSION PRODUCTS RULING
The Supreme Court addressed two key issues in Lexmark. First,
whether a patentee that sells an item under an express restriction on the
purchaser’s right to reuse or resell the product may enforce that restriction
through an infringement lawsuit; and second, whether a patentee exhausts
its patent rights by selling its product outside the United States where
American patent laws do not apply.43
Overruling the Federal Circuit’s prior decision on both counts, the
Court held “that a patentee’s decision to sell a product exhausts all of its
patent rights in that item, regardless of any restrictions the patentee
purports to impose or the location of the sale.”44
In finding patent exhaustion with the first-sale, the Court drew
support for its reasoning in the doctrine of “restraint on alienation.” The
Court, quoting Lord Coke, stated that “[i]f an owner restricts the resale or
use of an item after selling it, that restriction ‘is voide, because . . . it is
against Trade and Traffique, and bargaining and contracting between man
and man.’”45 Similar to its holding for copyrighted works in Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court reiterated that the patent exhaustion doctrine
“is not a presumption about the authority that comes along with a sale; it
Id.
See Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1523.
43 Id. at 1529.
44 Id.
45 Id. (citing J. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY §27, at 18
(2d ed. 1895).
41
42
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is instead a limit on ‘the scope of the patentee’s rights’” and that patent
rights yield to this common law principle.46 Put simply, the Supreme Court
considered patent exhaustion automatic and mandatory upon first-sale.
Professor Sichelman and Professor Barnett, in their amicus brief on
Lexmark, have presented compelling economic arguments against such
mandatory exhaustion.47 They highlight numerous scenarios where it is
economically more efficient for a patentee to have more control over
downstream players and use cases of its patented technology. Mandatory
exhaustion upon first-sale forces the patentee to recover all of its costs
and margins from the first-sale and hence introduces inefficiencies.48
Instead, the approach suggested is that of a “presumptive” exhaustion
regime in which the patent owner and a licensee/purchaser can opt out of
exhaustion via contract.49
Interestingly, the Lexmark Court appeared to preserve the distinction
between a sale and a licensing transaction and thus left some wiggle room
for patentees in avoiding exhaustion. In essence, even though the Court
stated that the patent rights are exhausted upon the first-sale by the
patentee, it drew a careful distinction when it came to licensing.50 In so
doing, it distinguished General Talking Pictures stating that “General Talking
Pictures, stood for the modest principle that, if a patentee has not given
authority for a licensee to make a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the
patentee’s rights.”51 The Court went on to emphasize that the facts in
General Talking Pictures were different because the “licensee ‘knowingly
ma[de] … sales … outside the scope of its license.”’52
Nonetheless, the distinction appears somewhat tenuous. The facts in
Lexmark and General Talking Pictures are quite similar and would become
almost identical if Lexmark were to license to a third party, which would
subsequently sell the cartridges to Impression Products under a single-use

Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1526; Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U. S. 519,
538 (2013) (“[c]ommon law’s refusal to permit restraints on the alienation of chattels”).
47 Brief of 44 Law, Economics and Business Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent, Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017)
(No.15-1189).
48 Id. at 2.
49 Id. at 3–5.
50 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1535 (stating “General Talking Pictures involved a
fundamentally different situation.”).
51 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1535; see generally Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 127.
52 Id.
46
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restriction.53 Because Impression Products would then be aware of the
restriction, Lexmark would now be able to pursue infringement claim
against Lexmark under General Talking Pictures.54 Nevertheless (and as a
result), General Talking Pictures remains good law, confirming the limited
principle that “if a patentee has not given authority for a licensee to make
a sale, that sale cannot exhaust the patentee’s rights.”
Impact on Patentee’s Rights
By strengthening the patent exhaustion regime, the Court precluded
the possibility of infringement claims against post-sale restriction
violations. The Court then proceeded to push any post-sale restriction
violation claims into the realms of contract law.55 This is clearly not
preferable for patentees for two principal reasons. First, injunctive relief
available in infringement actions will not be available under contract law
under most circumstances, and the only available remedy will be monetary
damages. Second, although some third-party actions are possible, most
contract law claims will require the parties to be in privity. Both can
severely limit the patentee’s ability to control downstream usage, infringing
or not.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Can the Transaction be Structured as a Lease?
This proposal attempts to address the patentee’s interest in
maintaining control over the downstream distribution of patented
products in addition to (and with the aim of) preserving the rights to
pursue patent infringement claims. While the Supreme Court in Lexmark
accepted licensing as not triggering exhaustion, it quickly restricted such
immunity by deeming exhaustion to have occurred when a licensee in turn

See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 305 U.S. at 126 (finding that a licensee, which was
authorized to manufacture and sell patented vacuum tube amplifiers only for radio
amateur, experimental, and broadcast reception, was guilty of infringement when it made
and sold amplifiers for use in theaters as part of talking picture equipment).
54 Ryan Swank, Exhausting the Possibilities, L.A. LAW. MAG., Feb. 2018, at 35 (“Had
the third-party licensee made a sale outside the scope of the license to a purchaser
(Impression Products), and the purchaser was aware of the restrictions, Lexmark’s postsale restriction should have been upheld under the Supreme Court’s analysis.”).
55 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1526 (“As a result, even if the restrictions in Lexmark’s
contracts with its customers were clear and enforceable under contract law…”).
53
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sold the patented item.56 In copyright law, the relevant statute specifically
excludes the first-sale doctrine’s application when the copyrighted item is
transferred through “rental, lease, loan, or otherwise, without acquiring
ownership of it.”57 To a similar effect, there have been brief
recommendations in the literature suggesting “licensing” and “leasing”
approaches.58 In this proposed solution, we will take the next step and
develop a detailed framework for industry application of structuring
patented product transaction as a “lease.”
There are two key propositions fundamental to this proposed
framework. First, federal courts have held that UCC § 1-201(37)(b)
provides a conclusive test of when a lease is intended as security interest;
therefore, a patentee may follow UCC framework to structure the
transaction as a true lease.59 Second, as long as a true lease (and not a
Id. at 1534 (“[a] patentee can impose restrictions on licensees because a license
does not implicate the same concerns about restraints on alienation as a sale”); Lexmark,
137 S. Ct. at 1534 (“A patentee's authority to limit licensees does not, as the Federal Circuit
thought, mean that patentees can use licenses to impose post-sale restrictions
on purchasers that are enforceable through the patent laws. So long as a licensee complies
with the license when selling an item, the patentee has, in effect, authorized the sale.”).
57 17 U.S.C. § 109(d) (2020) (“The privileges prescribed by subsections (a) and (c) do
not, unless authorized by the copyright owner, extend to any person who has acquired
possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner, by rental, lease, loan,
or otherwise, without acquiring ownership of it.”).
58 Matthew K. Blackburn & Joshua D. Curry, Patent Exhaustion Dispute Likely Headed
for the Supreme Court, 8 LANDSLIDE 49 (2016) (“Therefore, clearly document the
transaction as a license/lease, establish that the patent holder retains title, and take
commercially reasonable steps to perfect that title.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Daniel
Hemel, Licensing in the Shadow of Impression Products, LEGAL AGGREGATE (May 31,
2017), https://law.stanford.edu/2017/05/31/licensing-in-the-shadow-of-impressionproducts/ (“Instead of buying your smartphone, you’ll ‘license’ it from Apple or
Samsung, which will retain title to the device.”); Aaron Perzanowski, Lexmark and the
Future of Sales, THE END OF OWNERSHIP (June 1, 2017), http://www.theendofownershi
p.com/blog/2017/6/1/thoughts-on-impression-products-vlexmark (“Another potential concern is that companies like Lexmark will stop selling
products altogether and move to lease, rental, or subscription models that don't entail
transfers of ownership to consumers.”); DJ Healey, Impression Products v. Lexmark: How
can sellers protect themselves after their patent rights are exhausted? Two examples and one warning,
LEXOLOGY (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dfdef37
c-f5cf-4d6b-be60-ec1fefef08da (“There is a body of law that allows some leases to be
treated as sales (e.g., for usury when used to finance what amounts to a purchase.
Regardless of state laws, the Supreme Court may not find the substance of a lease
transaction substantively different enough from a sale to prevent exhaustion.”).
59 In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982).
56
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security interest or a disguised sale) results from the transaction, the
lease—being only a possessory right—does not transfer the title, and
hence does not trigger exhaustion.60 Therefore, the key is to determine a
transaction structure that will qualify as a true lease.
i.

Definition of True Lease under the UCC

In an agreement that constitutes a true lease and not a disguised
security interest under the UCC, the lessor has title to the goods at all
times.61 The lessee acquires no ownership, title, property, right, equity or
interest in the goods other than its leasehold interest.62 UCC § 1-201
provides the relevant definition of “security interest.”63 A security interest
in the lessee may only be created if an ownership, title, or possessory
interest existed in the lessee, and was attached at the time of the
transaction.64 Therefore, a lease that creates a security interest effectively
resembles a loan or a conditional sale agreement, and hence may not be
termed a “true lease.”
ii. UCC §1-203 Lease Distinguished from Security Interest
The characterization of an agreement as a lease compared to a
disguised security interest has been a heavily litigated matter in bankruptcy
courts.65 Distinguishing a lease from a conditional sale or security interest
is therefore critical. In litigation, courts have primarily looked at UCC § 1203 as a significant part of the analysis. However, on occasion, the courts
have also looked at additional factors, such as facts and circumstances of
the transaction—especially the reversionary interest retained by the lessor
at the end of the lease.66 The Seventh Circuit, in In re Marhoefer Packing Co.,
Inc., held UCC § 1-203 to be a conclusive test in determining if a lease is a
true lease or a disguised security interest, and suggested further scrutiny
60 Lexmark, 137 S. Ct. at 1535; U.C.C. §

2-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N

2002).
U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001).
63 Id.
64 Lawrence Safran et al., Country Q&A United States, FINANCE 2009–10, 143–44
(2010), https://m.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/country-q-and-a-united-states-propertysecurity-interests.
65 See, e.g., In re Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors, Inc., 579 B.R. 43 (Bankr.
D. Md. 2017).
66 See, e.g., 674 F.2d, supra note 59.
61
62
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based on the facts of the specific case to ensure proper characterization
of the transaction.67 The Ninth Circuit relied on Marhoefer in The Aerospace
Corporation v. Comdisco to determine if the personal property lease between
the parties was a true lease. 68 Copyright courts have also engaged in
similar analyses, albeit without specifically referring to UCC § 1-203, in
trying to determine the “economic realities” of the transaction. In Softman
Products Company, LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., the court determined that the
license was in fact a sale because of the “economic realities”—the amount,
nature and duration—of the “licensing” payment.69 In a tax matter in Swift
Dodge v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit performed an economic realities
analysis that included evaluation of the rights, benefits, and obligations of
the parties to determine if the lease was a true lease and not a conditional
sale.70
Pulling this all together, we begin with UCC § 1-203, often termed as
the “Economic Realities Test,” to construct an “economic” framework to
assess the transaction.71 Under UCC § 1-203, a lease creates a security
interest if the consideration is fixed and not terminable by the lessee and
if:
The original lease term is equal to or greater than the
remaining economic life of the equipment.
The lessee is required to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life or is required to become the owner of the goods
if the original term is less than the remaining economic life of
the property.
67 Id. at 1142 (holding that while section 1-201(37)(b) does provide a conclusive test
of when a lease is intended as security, that test does not apply in every case in which the
disputed lease contains an option to purchase for nominal or no consideration).
68 Aerospace Corp. v. Comdisco, 113 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
defendant was liable to pay rent to the plaintiff under two personal property leases).
69 SoftMan Prod. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(finding that the circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly suggested that the
transaction was in fact a sale rather than a license. For example, the purchaser obtained
a single copy of the software, with documentation, for a single price, which the purchaser
paid at the time of the transaction, and which constituted the entire payment for the
“license.” The license ran for an indefinite term without provisions for renewal).
70 Swift Dodge v. Comm'r, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding the existence of a
conditional sale after a review of the benefits, obligations, and rights of Swift Dodge and
the vehicle users).
71 U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N).
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The lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life for no additional consideration or for nominal
additional consideration.
The lessee has an option to purchase the goods for no additional
consideration or for nominal consideration.72

In In re Jeffrey Owen d/b/a C & J Express Co., the court primarily focused
on the “economic realities” of the transaction—the “bright-line” rule
outlined by §1-203.73 In that case, the lessee had no option to purchase
except by paying fair market value at a sale conducted at the conclusion of
the lease term, the term of lease was for less than the economic life of
goods, and the present value of lease payments was less than the purchase
price of trailers ($82,924 compared to $91,745).74 The court held that the
transaction was a true lease.75
Federal courts have insisted on scrutinizing the additional facts and
circumstances surrounding the transactions. In In re Marhoefer Packing
Company, Inc., the Seventh Circuit, while holding the UCC § 1-203 test to
be “conclusive,” further reviewed the terms of the lease and held that the
lease was a true lease even with a nominal ($1) purchase option price. 76
The court found the total amount of rent, whether the lessee acquired any
equity in the leased property, the useful (remaining) life of the leased
goods, and the nature of the lessor's business to be the important factors
in determining whether the transaction was a lease.77 In In re Keith Alan
Powers, the court found Marhoefer controlling in determining the lease to be
a true lease with similar facts.78 In In re Spencer Jerome Tillery, the termination

U.C.C. § 1-203 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N).
In re Owen, 221 B.R. 56, 57 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1998).
74 Id. at 62.
75 Id. at 64.
76 In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d at 1142 (holding that it was a true lease because
neither the option to purchase for one dollar at the conclusion of a second four-year
term, nor the initial option to purchase it for $9,968 after the first four years, gives rise
to a conclusive presumption under clause (b) of section 1-201(37) that the lease is
intended as security).
77 Id. at 1145.
78 In re Powers, 983 F.2d 88, 90 (7th Cir. 1993) (“This case is controlled by our
decision in Matter of Marhoefer Packing Co., Inc.”).
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amount or reversionary interest retained by the lessor was held to be
indicative that it was not a true lease.79
Similarly, in a copyright infringement action in Softman Products Co.,
LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., the court looked at the price, lack of renewal
terms/indefinite term, a single payment, and no product return to
determine that the license was in fact a sale, based on the economic
realities of the transaction.80
In Ford v. Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors, Inc., the lease between
Ford Motors and Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors passed the
UCC “bright-line” test for a true lease under § 1-203.81 However, the court
engaged in a contextual analysis and looked at the facts and circumstances
surrounding the agreement.82 The court determined that the central
feature of a true lease was the reservation of an economically meaningful
interest to the lessor at end of lease term. That is, if there is a meaningful
reversionary interest, either an up-side right or a down-side risk, then the
parties have signed a lease and not a security agreement.83 In this case, the
residual value of the vehicles was stated to be 10% at the end of the lease,
and therefore, the court held that the “lessor transferred title to the goods,
in substance if not in form,” resulting in a sale rather than a true lease.84
This subsequent “contextual analysis” is performed by the courts as
the second step after the UCC § 1-203 bright-line rule, principally to
determine if the lessor has retained a meaningful reversionary interest in
the product at the end of the lease term.85 This second step of assessment
can be summarized as a six-factor (sometimes seven-factor) analysis
evaluating:

Bill Swad Leasing Co. v. Stikes (In re Tillery), 571 F.2d 1361, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“[T]he security interest of Swad in the vehicle was neither perfected under the law of
Alabama, nor under the law of Ohio . . . the rights of the Trustee in said vehicle are
superior to those of Swad, and he is entitled to sell the vehicle as an asset of this estate”).
80 SoftMan, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
81 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors, Inc. (In re
Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors, Inc.), 579 B.R. 43, 51 (Bankr. D. Md. 2017).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 52.
85 See In re Gateway Ethanol, L.L.C., 415 B.R. 486, 503–504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009);
In re UNI Imaging Holdings, LLC, 423 B.R. 406, 418 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010).
79
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1) The anticipated useful life of the equipment;
2) The ability of the lessor to market the equipment at
the end of the lease term;
3) The amount of the lease payments over the term of
the contract in relation to the initial value of the
equipment;
4) Whether the equipment is unique because it was
designed for installation in the debtor’s (lessee’s)
facility;
5) Whether at the time of the agreement the long-term
operation of the debtor’s (lessee’s) facility required its
continued possession of the equipment; and
6) The economic benefit to the debtor (lessee) in having
the transaction structured as a lease rather than a sale.86
The burden of proof to determine the fair market value of the
purchase option under the UCC § 1-203 test, if such an option is part of
the transaction, rests upon the party challenging the lease.87 In GE v.
WorldCom, Inc., WorldCom wanted to recharacterize the lease of
telecommunications equipment as a disguised security agreement.88 The
court held that WorldCom did not satisfy its burden of proof in
establishing whether the purchase option price at the end of the lease was
nominal consideration, and their summary judgment motion was denied.89
B. Transaction Structure
Applying the analysis developed in the preceding section, we will now
devise a four-step framework of the deal structure for two distinct
transaction scenarios: sale to the end-consumer and license to a
In re UNI Imaging Holdings, LLC, 423 B.R. at 419; See In re Loop Hosp. P’ship, 35
B.R. 929, 935–36 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983) (listing seven primary factors and up to fifteen
factors to determine if a meaningful reversionary interest is created).
87 WorldCom, Inc. v. GE Glob. Asset Mgmt. Servs. (In re WorldCom, Inc.), 339 B.R.
56, 62 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
88 Id. at 61.
89 Id. at 74.
86
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manufacturer/OEM. The first step will identify the players and their
transactional relationships. The second step will define the economic
realities of the transaction per UCC § 1-203. The third step will address
the presence of a meaningful reversionary interest. The fourth and final
step will identify industry-specific considerations.
The first transaction scenario entails the transaction taking place
directly between the patentee, who is also the manufacturer of the
patented product, and the end-consumer (“Patentee-Consumer”
scenario). Such a scenario is typically encountered in the printer industry.
In the first step of the analysis, transactional relationships between the
parties are identified. In this first transaction scenario, there are two
primary players—the patentee and the end-consumer. The agreement will
thus be structured as a “lease” of the patented product. The patentee
being the “lessor,” and the end-consumer being the “lessee.” The lessee
may not be mandated to renew the lease but may choose to do so. This
will satisfy UCC § 1-203(b)(2). An option to purchase the product at the
end of the lease will not be available. This will satisfy UCC § 1-203(b)(4).
In the second step, the economic realities of the transaction are
determined. To this end, the lessor must determine (i) the economic life
of the product, (ii) the fair market value of the product, and (iii) the endof-lease plan for the product.
To ensure a true lease, the lease term shall be less than the estimated
economic life determined at the beginning of the lease. Subsequent
renewals of the agreement should ensure that the total lease duration does
not exceed the overall economic life of the product. The courts have not
provided bright-line rules or recommendations in determining the
economic life of the product. Industry estimates and prevailing norms
may therefore suffice. In the event of dispute, the burden of proof will lie
with the party challenging the nature of the transaction.
Secondly, the total of the lease payments may not exceed the fair
market value of the product at the time of transaction. However, this
factor is not considered dispositive under UCC § 1-203(c)(1).
Nevertheless, the fair market value determination will be important in
determining the reversionary interest value.
Thirdly, the end-of lease plan must also be assessed. To support a true
lease, the lessee may either renew the lease for another period, not
exceeding the economic life of the product, or may return the product to
the lessor. To incentivize continued patronage by the lessee as well as to
create a meaningful reversionary interest, the lessor may award a “return
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reward” to the lessee in the form of credit toward another lease of the
next generation of the product.90
The third step, and a critical feature of the transaction, evaluates the
presence of a meaningful reversionary interest—either an upside gain or
a down-side risk. A significant upfront deposit, to be refunded at the end
of the lease upon return of the product, can reasonably demonstrate the
mitigation of the down-side risk. Similarly, an “end of lease” payment—
if the product must be retained by the lessee—commensurate with the fair
market value of the product at the time of return, or simply accepting the
return may be sufficient upside gain.91 Some courts have held a 10%–25%
residual value to be insufficient to create a meaningful reversionary
interest.92 In the event of dispute, courts will rely on available information
to make this determination.93 As such, the lessor may either refund the
deposit or waive the “end-of-lease” payment, whichever is applicable,
upon successful product return. Should the customer choose not to return
the product, the lessor can elect to apply the “end of lease” payment as a
“rebate” toward the next lease with the customer. This will avoid the
customer actually having to outlay cash and will result in the added benefit
of creating customer loyalty and repeat business.
In the final step, additional industry-specific features can be included
in the transaction structure. For example, a “refurbish/re-lease” program
by the lessor for the returned products can be attractive for price-sensitive
markets for products such as printers. Not only will the availability of
lower-priced (refurbished) printers enable a different (price-sensitive)
market segment, but the existence of such a program will also demonstrate
a meaningful reversionary interest in the originally leased product.

See discussion infra pp. 155–160.
See Frontier Energy, LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.),
439 B.R. 674, 679 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010) (explaining that a meaningful reversionary
interest was found where, at the end of the agreement, the lessor was free to lease the
property to another party); Sankey v. ABCO Leasing, Inc. (In re Sankey), 307 B.R. 674,
682 (D. Alaska 2004) (explaining that if the lessor will receive either return of the leased
goods or the reasonably predicted fair market value the goods will have at the time the
option is to be performed, the lessor has retained a meaningful reversionary interest).
92 See In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp., 439 B.R. at 680–681.; HMO Sys., Inc. v.
Choicecare Health Servs., 665 P.2d 635, 638 (Colo. App. 1983) (finding that if the option
to purchase price is variable with the lease payments and less than the fair market value,
it is to be considered as showing the intent of the parties to make a lease as security).
93 In re Lasting Impressions Landscape Contractors, Inc., 579 B.R. at 56.
90
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The second transaction scenario involves an intermediate
licensee/manufacturer who licenses the technology from the patentee and
manufactures the product. The licensee then transacts with the endconsumer (“Patentee-Licensee-Consumer” scenario). This scenario is
typical of the personal computer (“PC”) and smartphone industry, and the
transaction between the licensee and the end-consumer will now entail
leasing of the product instead of a sale.
As in the Patentee-Consumer scenario, the first step of the analysis
involves identifying the parties and their transactional relationships. There
are at least three primary parties in this transaction scenario: the patentee
or licensor, the manufacturer or licensee, and the end-consumer. The
agreement between the patentee and the manufacturer will be a “licensing”
agreement. This agreement will clearly specify the restriction that the
patented product may only be “leased” by the manufacturer to
downstream players, including to the end-consumers.94 The agreement
between the manufacturer licensee and subsequent downstream player will
be structured as a “lease” of the patented product, with the manufacturer
being the “lessor,” and the downstream player being the “lessee.” The lease
agreement shall clearly specify the restriction placed by the patentee on
the manufacturer. A shrinkwrap agreement may be used to effectuate the
lease.95 The lessee may not be mandated to renew the lease but may choose
to do so. This will then satisfy UCC § 1-203(b)(2). An option to purchase
the product at the end of the lease is not available. This will satisfy UCC
§ 1-203(b)(4).
The second step and the third step of the analysis framework are
substantially similar to the framework outlined in the previously described
Patentee-Consumer scenario. That is, in the second step, the economic
realities of the transaction are determined by assessing the (i) the
economic life of the product, (ii) the fair market value of the product, and
(iii) the end-of-lease plan for the patented product; whereas the third step
is focused on determining the presence of a meaningful reversionary
interest—either an upside gain or a down-side risk.

94 Gen. Talking Pictures Corp, 304 U.S. at 179 (finding that a license conditioning “field
of use” restriction was enforceable and the licensee was guilty of patent infringement
when the restriction was not followed).
95 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1447–48 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
computer software shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general).
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In the final step, additional industry-specific features can be included
in the transaction structure. For example, a “refurbish/re-lease” program
by the lessor for the returned products can be attractive for price-sensitive
markets for products such as PCs or smartphones. Not only will the
availability of lower-priced (refurbished) items enable a different (pricesensitive) market segment, but the existence of such a program will also
demonstrate a meaningful reversionary interest for the lessor in the
(originally) leased product.

Fig. 1 PC Supply Chain
Example
As illustrated in the PC Supply Chain Example above (see Fig. 1), a PC
involves numerous components, many of which are patented and
licensed.96 A multi-license product transaction requiring coordination and
alignment between multiple licensors may get complicated. The deal may
become complex if some licensors require a sale of the product for
reasons particular to their businesses, while others may agree to the leasing
model. In this event, the agreement will need to reflect the leasing and the
subsequent return of only the part that embodies the patented technology.
For example, in a smartphone, if the 4G Standard Essential Patent
(“SEP”) holder follows the solution proposed here, while the touch-screen
patentee requires a sale to realize their revenue, the 4G SEP holder (4G
Kannan Govindan & Maria Nicoleta Popiuc, Reverse Supply Chain Coordination by
Revenue Sharing Contract: A Case for the Personal Computers Industry, 233 EUROPEAN JOURNAL
OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 326, 329 (2014).
96
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patentee) may require the return of only the baseband chip that embodies
the 4G technology.
A separate agreement or additional terms related to execution of the
end-of-lease or Take-Back plan (see Fig. 1) will be required between the
patentee and the manufacturer in order to ensure proper accounting of
“end of lease” or “rebate” payments and to incentivize the manufacturer’s
ongoing participation.
C. Risks/Weaknesses of Proposed Solution
i.

UCC § 1-203 Analysis Applied to Patent Transactions

The characterization of leases and sales/security interests has been a
heavily litigated area in commercial transactions as well as (and especially
in) bankruptcy courts.97 However, there is very little case law or evidence
of its application in consumer goods transactions. Further, the primary
applicability of UCC § 1-203 appears to be in equipment leases in a
business-to-business (B-2-B) setting. While federal and patent courts have
cited UCC authority in certain areas, such as interpreting contract terms
under UCC § 2-207 and § 2-209, the application and applicability of UCC
§ 1-203 in a patented goods transaction has not been tested in either a
business environment or in case law.98
ii. Untested Business Models and Financials
The proposed solution involves innovation in the business models of
patentees as well as downstream players. The new business models involve
a shift from “selling” to “leasing” of products. While licensing of patented
products is a mature business model that has been widely adopted by
patentees, licensing followed by leasing is fundamentally different from
licensing followed by selling. As such, it may involve non-trivial

See cases supra notes 65–89.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 976 F.2d at 708 n.7 (“In accordance with the Uniform
Commercial Code a license notice may become a term of sale, even if not part of the
original transaction, if not objected to within a reasonable time. U.C.C. § 2–207(2)(c).”);
Wing Shing Prods. (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F. Supp. 2d 388, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Under the Delaware U.C.C., ‘a signed agreement which excludes
modification or rescission except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or
rescinded.’ Del.Code Ann. tit. 6 § 2–209(2).”).
97
98
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modifications to existing businesses and could present significant business
and financial risks.
iii. Practical Challenges
Even after the business model changes are adopted by the parties, the
proposed solution requires strong alignment between all of them for
successful execution. Because each party is required to enter into a binding
agreement, such alignment may be difficult to achieve. For example, there
could be accounting and financial reasons why a manufacturer licensee
may not want to enter in a leasing transaction with its customers. Similarly,
there could be logistical and resource constraints in managing product
returns and accounting of end-of-lease deposit or rebate payments. As the
complexity of the product and supply chain grows, the number of
licensors and downstream players will also increase. This can introduce
significant complexities in creating and reaching agreements between all
relevant parties. Finally, there could be disagreements regarding even basic
terms due to unknown ex-ante risk-reward distribution between the
parties. Put differently, the manufacturer licensee may not foresee the
benefits of this solutions as clearly as the patentee licensor.
Nevertheless, because the proposed solution promises to alleviate a
significant concern—that of avoiding patent exhaustion—and preserves
patent infringement claims, we believe that the patentees will be highly
motivated to explore such agreements. Future agreements will also benefit
from transaction and business data as well as litigation outcomes, if any,
of earlier agreements.
D. Additional Issues to be Considered
i.

Patent Misuse and Antitrust Issues

Patent misuse may be invoked as a defense when a patentee is deemed
to engage in otherwise acceptable activities in conjunction with the
transaction relating to the patented goods.99 Tying or combining, and
requiring the consumer to participate in, such other business activities as
a condition to the patent transaction may give rise to patent misuse. Patent
misuse is typically implicated when the patentee is deemed to have market
power.100 Patent misuse is not implicated when the patentee does not have
99

14A Chisum on Patents 5640 (2020).
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31, (2006).
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market power.101 An infringer may raise patent misuse defense contending
the proposed lease transaction structure to be an abuse of market power
leading to patent misuse. This risk may be especially significant when the
patentee indeed has a dominant market position.
Antitrust laws attempt to level the playing field by curbing anticompetitive behavior of market participants.102 In so doing, the antitrust
laws work to increase competition, thereby allowing free market
economics to thrive.103 The proposed transaction structure could be
construed by regulators to constrain market participants of such economic
freedom, especially if the patentee enjoys a significant competitive
advantage in the given market.
ii. International Exhaustion
Exhaustion triggered by an international sale may also be addressed
with the proposed leasing approach. The same framework may be applied
to avoid international exhaustion. However, because the transaction is
occurring overseas, the assessment of whether a transaction is a “true
lease” may be subject to international law. Should disputes arise, the weight
international courts would afford federal common law vis-à-vis
international law remains unclear.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Lexmark decision was an unwelcome ruling for the patentee
community. Patentees effectively lost control over downstream uses and
transactions. Further, the patentees are now being forced to recover all
costs/margins in the first sale, reducing the opportunity for market
segmentation or price-discrimination. The ruling on international
exhaustion also opened the door for gray market imports and the resulting
price arbitrage.
This proposal provides an alternative to the patentee community in
structuring their patented product transaction as a lease instead of a sale,
thereby avoiding exhaustion. A framework for the deal structure was
developed to ensure that the lease transaction satisfies the “true lease”
Id. at 46.
Gene Quinn, Patent Misuse, Exploring the Basics, IP WATCHDOG (Nov. 18,
2011), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/11/18/patent-misuse-exploring-thebasics/id=20460/.
103 Id.
101
102
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criterion and withstands the test of “economic realities,” which the courts
often inquire into. There is little prior work or guidance in this area, and
this proposal presents a novel, though untested approach. It involves
business model innovation on the patentee’s part. Such fundamental
change is often difficult to implement and requires close alignment and
agreement between all parties, including licensee manufacturers and endconsumers. Nevertheless, given the significant benefit patentees will
realize by avoiding patent exhaustion, patentees should be highly
motivated to explore this solution.

***

